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Introduction
Dagan et al. (1997) introduced a noncooperative bargaining procedure for bankruptcy problems. In this procedure the player with the highest claim has a distinguished role. He makes a proposal and the remaining players accept or reject sequentially. Players who accept the proposal leave the game with their share; if a player rejects the proposal this con ‡ict is solved bilaterally by applying a normative solution concept (a "bilateral principle" based on a bankruptcy rule) to a two-claimant bankruptcy problem in which the estate is the sum of the two proposed payo¤s. They show that a large class of consistent and monotone bankruptcy rules can be obtained as the Nash outcomes of the game. They describe this kind of procedure as consistency based: starting from a consistent solution concept, they construct extensive forms whose subgames relate to the respective reduced cooperative games and by …nding the equilibrium of the extensive form they are able to provide noncooperative foundations for the consistent solution of interest. Arin and Feltkamp (2007) consider an analogous procedure for veto balanced games, in which a veto player is the proposer and the bilateral principle in the event of a disagreement is the standard solution of a Davis-Maschler reduced game (unless this would result in a negative payo¤ for the responder, in which case the responder gets zero). The nucleolus is a natural candidate to be a Nash outcome in this case, since it satis…es the Davis-Maschler reduced game property. However, it is not always obtained because it does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity even in the class of veto balanced games: if the veto balanced game v is such that reducing v(N ) never increases the nucleolus payo¤ for the veto player, the nucleolus is a Nash outcome; otherwise the proposer is better-o¤ by making an ine¢ cient proposal rather than proposing the nucleolus.
In the present paper, we modify the above procedure by allowing the proposer to make a …xed number of sequential proposals, so that players can continue bargaining over the remainder if the …rst proposal did not exhaust the value of the grand coalition. Each period results in a partial agreement, and then a new TU game is formed where the values of the coalitions take into account the agreements reached so far; the …nal outcome is the sum of all partial agreements. We focus on the case in which the proposer can make as many proposals as there are players in the game. We then analyze the game assuming myopic behavior of the responders, that is, we assume that responders consider each period in isolation, accepting or rejecting the current proposal without anticipating the e¤ects of their decision on future periods. The proposer is assumed to behave rationally, taking into account the e¤ect of his actions on future periods and also taking into account that the responders behave myopically. We refer to this kind of strategy pro…le as a myopic best response equilibrium (MBRE).
It turns out that all MBRE lead to the same outcome, which is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) . This solution concept is based on the idea that the strength of player i can be measured by the maximum amount a coalition can obtain without player i, denoted by d i . Since it is impossible for any coalition to obtain a payo¤ above d i without i's cooperation, player i can be viewed as having a veto right over v(N ) d i . The serial rule divides v(N ) in segments, and each segment is equally divided between the players that have a veto right over it. The serial rule is always in the core, and unlike the nucleolus it satis…es aggregate monotonicity.
If responders take into account the e¤ect of their actions on future periods, there may be subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes di¤erent from the serial rule. The order of moves may be such that the proposer is able to hide some payo¤ from a stronger player with the cooperation of a weaker player: the proposal faced by the stronger player is not too favorable for the proposer so that the stronger player cannot challenge it, but later on a weak player rejects the proposal and transfers some payo¤ to the proposer; the weak player may have an incentive to do so because of the e¤ect of this agreement on future periods. However, if the order of moves is such that stronger players have the last word in the sense that they respond to the proposal after weaker ones, the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is the serial rule. Hence, myopic and rational behavior of the responders lead to the same outcome in this case. 3 
Preliminaries

TU games
A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function form is a pair (N; v) , where N is a …nite set of n elements and v : 2 N ! R is a real-valued function on the family 2 N of all subsets of N with v(;) = 0: Elements of N are called players and the real-valued function v the characteristic function of the game. We shall often identify the game (N; v) with its characteristic function and write v instead of (N; v). Any subset S of the player set N is called a coalition. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted by jSj. In this work we only consider games where all coalitions have nonnegative worth.
A payo¤ allocation is represented by a vector x 2 R n ; where x i is the payo¤ assigned by x to player i. We denote P i2S
x is called a feasible allocation; if x(N ) = v(N ), x is called an e¢ cient allocation. An e¢ cient allocation satisfying x i v(i) for all i 2 N is called an imputation and the set of imputations is denoted by I(N; v): The set of nonnegative feasible allocations is denoted by D(N; v) and formally de…ned as follows
The core of a game is the set of imputations that cannot be blocked by any coalition, i.e.
A game with a nonempty core is called a balanced game. A game v is a veto-rich game if it has at least one veto player and the set of imputations is nonempty. A player i is a veto player if v(S) = 0 for all coalitions where player i is not present. A balanced game with at least one veto player is called a veto balanced game.
A solution on a class of games 0 is a correspondence that associates with every game
. This solution is called e¢ cient if this inequality holds with equality. The solution is called single-valued if it contains a unique element for every game in the class. We now introduce the simplest monotonicity requirement that we can ask of a solution. Let be a single-valued solution on a class of games 0 . We say that solution satis…es the aggregate monotonicity property (Meggido, 1974) if the following holds: for all v; w 2 0 , such that v(S) = w(S) for all S 6 = N and v(N ) < w(N ), then i (v) i (w) for all i 2 N . Given a vector x 2 R N , the excess of a coalition S at x in a game v is de…ned as e(S; x) := v(S) x(S): Let (x) be the vector of all excesses at x arranged in non-increasing order of magnitude. The lexicographic order L between two vectors x and y is de…ned by x L y if there exists an index k such that x l = y l for all l < k and x k < y k and the weak lexicographic order
Schmeidler (1969) introduced the nucleolus of a game v; denoted by (N; v); as the imputation that lexicographically minimizes the vector of non-increasingly ordered excesses over the set of imputations. In formula:
For any game v with a nonempty imputation set, the nucleolus is a singlevalued solution, is contained in the kernel and lies in the core provided that the core is nonempty. In the class of veto balanced games the kernel, the prekernel and the nucleolus coincide (see Arin and Feltkamp (1997) ).
1 Let (N; v) be a game, T a subset of N such that T 6 = N; ; , and x a feasible allocation.
Then the Davis-Maschler reduced game with respect to N n T and x is the game (N n T; v 
Note that we have de…ned a modi…ed Davis-Maschler reduced game where the value of the grand coalition of the reduced game is x(N nT ) instead of v(N ) x(T ): If x is e¢ cient both reduced games coincide. See also Peleg (1986).
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If he says no he receives the payo¤ 2 y 2 = max 0;
where
> :
If he says no he receives the payo¤
Now,
4. The game ends when stage n is played and we de…ne x n (N; v) as the vector with coordinates x n j j2N
:
In this game we assume that the con ‡ict between the proposer and a responder is solved bilaterally. In the event of con ‡ict, the players face a two-person TU game that shows the strength of each player given that the rest of the responders are passive. Once the game is formed the allocation proposed for the game is a normative proposal, a kind of restricted standard solution 3 .
The Nash outcomes of the game
Given a game (N; v) and a feasible allocation x we de…ne f ij as follows:
If there is no confusion we write
The concept f ij (x) is closely related to the surplus of i against j at x (terminology of Maschler, 1992) , s ij (x) = max i2S N nfjg fv(S) x(S)g. Given a coalition S, x(S) v(S) is the satisfaction of coalition S at x; thus f ij (x) is the minimum satisfaction of a coalition that contains i but not j. The higher f ij (x), the better i is treated by the allocation x in comparison with j. The kernel can be de…ned as the set of imputations such that
The set of bilaterally balanced allocations for player i is
while the set of optimal allocations for player i in the set F i (N; v) is de…ned as follows:
In the class of veto-balanced games, F i (N; v) is a nonempty and compact set for all i, thus the set B i (N; v) is nonempty.
Theorem 1 (Arin and Feltkamp, 2007) Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game and let G(N; v) be its associated tree game. Let z be a feasible and nonnegative allocation. Then z is a Nash (SPE) outcome if and only if z 2 B 1 (N; v).
The idea behind this result is the following. As shown in Arin and Feltkamp (2007) , the restricted standard solution that is applied if player i rejects a proposal in round t results in f 1i (x t ) = f i1 (x t ), unless this would mean a negative payo¤ for player i, in which case f i1 (x t ) > f 1i (x t ) and x f i1 (x t 1 ) and to accept all other proposals. Since player i rejects proposals with f 1i (x t 1 ) > f i1 (x t 1 ) and this rejection results in f 1i (x t ) = f i1 (x t ), the proposal in force after i has the move always satis…es f i1 (x t ) f 1i (x t ). Subsequent actions by players moving after i can only reduce f 1i (:), hence
. Player 1 then maximizes his own payo¤ under the constraint that the …nal allocation has to be bilaterally balanced.
The elements of B 1 (N; v) are not necessarily e¢ cient. Indeed, in some cases, the set B 1 (N; v) contains no e¢ cient allocations. The existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium is not guaranteed because the nucleolus does not satisfy aggregate monotonicity for the class of veto balanced games. If (N; v) is such that decreasing the value of the grand coalition (keeping the values of other coalitions constant) leads to the nonincreasing of the nucleolus payo¤ for player 1, the nucleolus of the game is a Nash outcome (Arin and Feltkamp, 2007, theorem 13).
A new game: sequential proposals
The model
We extend the previous model to n periods. Given a veto balanced game with a proposer and an order on the set of responders we will construct a tree game, denoted by G n (N; v). In this game the proposer can make n sequential proposals, and each proposal is answered by the responders as in the previous model.
Formally, the resulting outcome of playing the game can be described by the following algorithm.
Input : a veto balanced game (N; v) with a veto player, player 1, as proposer, and an order on the set of the remaining players (responders) which may be di¤erent for di¤erent periods.
Output : a feasible and nonnegative allocation x:
1. Start with period 1. Given a veto balanced TU game (N; v) and the order on the set of responders corresponding to period 1, players play the game G(N; v). The outcome of this period determines the veto balanced TU game for the second period, denoted by (N; v 2;x 1 ), where v 2;x 1 (S) = max f0; min fv(N ) x 1 (N ); v(S) x 1 (S)gg and x 1 is the …nal outcome obtained in the …rst period. Note that by construction, the game (N; v 2;x 1 ) is a veto balanced game where player 1 is a veto player. Then go to the next step. The superscripts in the characteristic function denote at which period and after which outcome the game is considered as the game in force. If no confusion arises we write v 2 instead of v 2;x 1 :
2. Let the period be t (t < n+1) and the TU game (N; v t;x t 1 ): We play the game G(N; v t;x t 1 ) and de…ne the veto balanced TU game (N;
is the …nal outcome obtained in period t. Then go to the next step.
3. The game ends after stage n of period n: (If at some period before n the proposer makes an e¢ cient proposal (e¢ cient according to the TU game underlying at this period) the game is trivial for the rest of the periods).
4. The outcome is the sum of the outcomes generated at each period.
In this paper we focus on games with n periods (the number of players). Games with a di¤erent number of periods can be easily de…ned and will be used in some of the proofs. We refer to the game with m proposals as G m (N; v), where m 1.
A serial rule for veto balanced games
We now introduce a solution concept de…ned on the class of veto balanced games and denoted by . Somewhat surprisingly, this solution will be related to the non-cooperative game with sequential proposals. Let (N; v) be a veto balanced game where player 1 is a veto player. De…ne for each player i a value d i as follows:
Because 1 is a veto player, d 1 = 0: Let d n+1 := v(N ) and rename the remaining players according to the nondecreasing order of those values. That is, player 2 is the player with the lowest value and so on. The solution associates to each veto balanced game, (N; v), the following payo¤ vector:
for all l 2 f1; :::; ng :
The following example illustrates how the solution behaves.
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g be a set of players and consider the following 4-person veto balanced game (N; v) where
Computing the vector of d-values we get:
Applying the formula,
The formula suggests a serial rule principle (cf. Moulin and Shenker, 1992). Since it is not possible for any coalition to obtain a payo¤ above d i without player i's cooperation, we can view player i as having a right over the amount
:::; v(N ) d n ) and each payo¤ segment is divided equally among the players that have a right over it.
In the class of veto balanced games, the solution satis…es some wellknown properties such as nonemptiness, e¢ ciency, anonymity and equal treatment of equals among others. It also satis…es aggregate monotonicity. 4 We now show that provides a core allocation for veto balanced games. Proof. We need to prove that for any coalition S it holds that v(S) P l2S l : Note that
since 1 is a veto player we have
The next section shows that (N; v) is the unique equilibrium outcome assuming that all responders act as myopic maximizers and the proposer plays a best response taking this into account.
Myopic Best Response Equilibrium
The …rst approach we take to solve the non-cooperative game with sequential proposals consists of analyzing myopic behavior of the responders. Responders behave myopically when they act as payo¤ maximizers in each period without considering the e¤ect of their actions on future periods.
Suppose all responders maximize payo¤s myopically for each period and that the proposer plays optimally taking into account that the responders are myopic maximizers. We call such a strategy pro…le a myopic best response equilibrium (MBRE). We will show in this section that all MBRE lead to the same outcome.
If there is only one period in the game, myopic and rational behavior coincide. This means that the following lemma holds if responders behave myopically.
Lemma 4 (Arin and Feltkamp, 2007, lemmas 2 and 3) Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game, and G n (N; v) its associated tree game. At any period k and stage t, the responder (say, i) will accept x
The notion of balanced proposals will play a central role in the proofs of the main results.
De…nition 5 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game. Consider its associated tree game G n (N; v): Given a period k; a proposal x is balanced if it results as the …nal outcome of period k regardless of the actions of the responders.
Balanced proposals coincide with the nucleolus (kernel) of special games. In the class of veto-rich games (games with at least one veto player and a nonempty set of imputations) the kernel and the nucleolus coincide (Arin and Feltkamp, 1997 ). Therefore we can de…ne the nucleolus as
We use this alternative de…nition of the nucleolus in the proof of the following lemma. 
Therefore, the bilateral kernel conditions are satis…ed for the veto player. Lemma 12 in Arin and Feltkamp (2007) shows that if the bilateral kernel conditions are satis…ed between the veto player and the rest of the players then the bilateral kernel conditions are satis…ed between any pair of players.
Therefore, x is the kernel (nucleolus) of the game (N; w): The converse statement can be proven in the same way.
We now show that, by making balanced proposals, the proposer can secure the payo¤ provided by the serial rule : Lemma 7 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game and G n (N; v) its associated tree game. Let z be a Nash outcome of the game G n (N; v):
Proof. The result is based on the fact that the proposer has a strategy with which he secures the payo¤
regardless of the strategies of the rest of the players by making a sequence of balanced proposals. The strategy is the following: At each period t; (t 2 f1; :::; ng) consider the set S t = fl : l tg and the proposal x t , de…ned as follows:
whenever x t is feasible and propose the 0 vector otherwise. It can be checked immediately that in each stage the proposed allocation will be the …nal allocation independently of the answers of the responders and independently of the order of those answers. The proposals are balanced proposals.
For example, in period 1, the proposal is (d 2 ; 0; :::; 0)
; 0; :::; 0 . If player 2 rejects, we have f 12 (:) =
As for other players i 6 = 1; 2, when computing f 1i we take into account that any coalition of positive value must include 1 and 2. Since players other than 1 and 2 are getting 0, the coalition 1 uses against i is S 2 arg max
In period 3, player 3 has become a veto player and the same process can be iterated until period n.
Therefore, this strategy of the proposer determines the total payo¤ of all the players, that is, the …nal outcome of the game G n (N; v): This …nal outcome coincides with the solution :
This proof, together with lemma 6, suggests a new interpretation of the serial rule. At each stage the proposal coincides with the nucleolus of a veto-rich game. Formally,
where the games (N; w i ) are de…ned as follows: w 1 (N ) = d 2 and w 1 (S) = v(S) otherwise. For i : 2; ::; n :
otherwise.
Remark 8
The serial rule can also be obtained by making balanced proposals if the game has n 1 periods. This is because the proposer can combine the …rst two proposals in the proof of lemma 7 by proposing (d 2 +
; 0; :::; 0) in the …rst period.
We now show that the proposer cannot improve upon in a MBRE.
Proposition 9 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game and G n (N; v) its associated tree game. Let z be a MBRE outcome of the game G n (N; v): Then
We will prove this proposition by a series of lemmas. We will …rst show that any payo¤ player 1 can obtain given myopic responder behavior can also be obtained by making balanced proposals: player 1 can cut the payo¤ of other players until a balanced proposal is obtained at no cost to himself (lemma 10). We will then show that the payo¤ player 1 can get with balanced proposals in a given period cannot exceed the serial rule of a particular TU game w t . Finally, we will check that the sum of the serial rules of the games w t cannot exceed the serial rule of the original game (N; v) (lemma 16), hence player 1's total payo¤ cannot exceed 1 (N; v).
Lemma 10 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced game. Consider the associated game with m stages G m (N; v). Let z = P m 1 x t be an outcome resulting from some strategy pro…le. Assume that the …nal outcome of any period t, x t , is such that for any player l, x t l f 1l (x t ; v t ). Then there exists y such that y 1 = z 1 , y = P m 1 q t where q t is a balanced proposal for period t.
Proof. If (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m ) is a sequence of balanced proposals the proof is done.
Suppose that (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m ) is not a sequence of balanced proposals. This means that for some x t and for some i 6 = 1 it holds that x t i > f 1i (x t ; v t ) and x t i > 0: Let k be the …rst period where such result holds. Therefore, (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x k 1 ) is a sequence of balanced proposals. We will construct a balanced proposal where the payo¤ of the proposer does not change.
Since
; by reducing the payo¤ of player i we can construct a new allocation y k such that f 1i (y also that reducing i's payo¤ can only lower f 1j (y k ), so it is still the case that f 1j (y k ) f j1 (y k ) for all j. Now, if there exists another player l such that f 1l (y k ) < f l1 (y k ) and y
Repeating this procedure we will end up with a balanced allocation. If q k is the …nal outcome of this procedure, q k is the nucleolus of the game (N; w k ) where w k (N ) = q k (N ) and w k (S) = v k (S) for all S 6 = N . The TU game (N; w k+1 ) resulting after proposing q k satis…es that w k+1 (S) v k+1 (S) for all S 3 1: Therefore, f 1i (x; w k+1 ) f 1i (x; v k+1 ) for any feasible allocation x, and x k+1 l f 1l (x k+1 ; w k+1 ) for all l. Consider the game (N; w k+1 ) and the payo¤ x k+1 . Suppose that
) for some i 6 = 1 and x k+1 i > 0: We can repeat the same procedure of period k until we obtain a balanced allocation q k+1 . The procedure can be repeated until the last period of the game to obtain the sequence of balanced proposals (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x k 1 ; q k ; :::; q m ). Some interesting properties of balanced proposals:
t is a balanced proposal, any player i with x t i > 0 will be a veto player at t + 1.
This is because if x
t is balanced we have f 1i (x t ; v t ) = x t i , so that all coalitions that have a positive v t but do not involve i have v t (S) < x t (S). Thus, after the payo¤s x t are distributed any coalition with positive value must involve i. Note that this result requires x t to be a balanced proposal and not merely the outcome of a MBRE. In a MBRE it may be the case that f 1i (x t ; v t ) < x t i , and we cannot conclude anything about the sign of f 1i (x t ; v t ).
The next lemma establishes a relationship between balanced proposals in G m (N; v) and the serial rule. Suppose x t is a balanced proposal in period t. Consider the game w t , where w t (S) = minfv t (S); x t (N )g. The serial rule of w t and the balanced proposal x t do not coincide in general. However, the set of players who receive a positive payo¤ in x t coincides with the set of players who receive a positive payo¤ according to the serial rule of w t . Proof. a) If x t k > 0 we need to prove that d k (N; w t ) < x t (N ), so that the serial rule of w t assigns a positive payo¤ to k. Let S 2 arg max T N nfkg v t (T ). Since x t is balanced we have f 1k (x t ) = x t k > 0 and that implies x t (S) > v t (S) (otherwise S could have been used to complain against k). Hence,
, where the last equality follows from lemma 11. 
Coalition P must contain all players receiving a positive payo¤ at x t (otherwise x t is not balanced since P can be used against any player outside P ). Therefore x t (N ) = x t (P ) v t (P ). Because of the way w t is de…ned it cannot exceed x t (N ), so x t (N ) = w t (P ) = d k (w t ) and k receives 0 according to the serial rule of w t . The following lemma concerns a property of the serial rule. By de…nition, the serial rule is such that d k is divided among players fj 2 N; j < kg. Above d k , player k and any player j < k get the same payo¤.
Lemma 13 For any player k we have P i2f1;2;:::;k 1g i = d k + (k 1) k : Hence, P i2f1;2;:::;k 1g i d k + k . The latter inequality is strict except if k = 2 or k = 0.
6, v(1; 2; 3; 4) = 10 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. The proposal x = (2; 1:5; 1:5; 0) is a balanced proposal with a total payo¤ distributed of 5 (and, because of lemma 6 and the uniqueness of the nucleolus, it is the only balanced proposal that distributes a total payo¤ of 5). The game w associated to this proposal is identical to v except that w(1; 2; 3) = w(N ) = 5. Its serial rule is (3; 1; 1; 0), which is di¤erent from the balanced proposal but gives a positive payo¤ to the same set of players.
The next lemma tell us that, given a strategy pro…le with balanced proposals, the proposer cannot get more than the serial rule of the games w t .
Lemma 14 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game. Consider the associated game with m stages G m (N; v). Let z = P m 1 x t be an outcome resulting from balanced proposals. Consider period t, its outcome x t and the game (N; w t ) where w t (S) = minfv t (S);
Proof. Let T be the set of veto players in (N; w t ), and let M = fl 1 ; :::; l m g be the ordered (according to the d values of (N; w t )) set of nonveto players that have received a positive payo¤ at x t . That is, d . If the coalition associated to f 1l 1 has a value of 0, it follows that x If Q * S, there is a player l p < l k such that l p = 2 S. Because x t is a balanced proposal, x t lp = f 1lp (x t ). Because the veto player can use S to complain against l p , f 1lp (
So far we have discussed the set of veto players and the set of nonveto players that are getting a positive payo¤ in x t . For players in N n(T [ M ), we have shown in lemma 12 that x t j = 0 implies j (N; w t ) = 0, hence x t j j (N; w t ) for all players.
Corollary 15 Putting lemma 14 together with the e¢ ciency of the serial rule
The only way in which player 1 can obtain the serial rule of (N; w t ) with balanced proposals is that all players in the game obtain their serial rule payo¤.
The sum of the serial rules of the games w t cannot exceed the serial rule of the original game. This is due to the following property of the serial rule: 
In the lemma, we take v(N ) and divide it in k positive parts, where k is a …nite number. Then we compute the serial rule for each of the k games, and see that each player gets the same in total as in the serial rule of the original game.
The k games are formed as follows: w k (N ) is always a k ; the other coalitions have v(S) minus what has been distributed so far according to the serial rule of the previous games, unless this would be negative (in which case the value is 0) or above w k (N ) (in which case the value is a k ). The idea of the proof is that player i cannot get anything until d i has been distributed, and from that point on i becomes veto. This happens regardless of the way v(N ) is divided into k parts. For the same reason, if
; player 1 will get less than 1 (N; v). Note that lemma 16 refers to a sequence of TU games such that each game is obtained after distributing the serial rule payo¤s for the previous game; the games w t in lemma 14 are obtained by subtracting balanced proposals from w t 1 . It turns out that the TU games involved are identical in both cases: the sequence w t depends only on the total amounts distributed x 1 (N ); :::; x n (N ) (denoted by a 1 , . .., a n in lemma 16). This is because the set of players that get a positive payo¤ at period t is the same in both cases (lemma 12) and all these players become veto at period t + 1 (lemma 11). Hence, any coalition with positive value at t has w t (S) = min(w t 1 (S) x t 1 (N ); x t (N )) in both cases.
Putting the above lemmas together we can prove proposition 9. First, any payo¤ player 1 can achieve in a MBRE can be achieved by balanced proposals (lemma 10). Second, given that proposals are balanced, the payo¤ player 1 can get cannot exceed the sum of the serial rules of the games w t (lemma 14). Finally, the sum of the serial rules of the games w t cannot exceed the serial rule of the original game (lemma 16).
Given that player 1 can never get more than 1 (N; v) in a MBRE by proposition 9 (and only if all players get their serial rule payo¤ by corollary 15), and that (N; v) is achievable by the sequential proposals described in lemma 7, we have the following result. Proof. In a MBRE, 1 (N; v) coincides with the equilibrium payo¤ for the proposer in the game G n (N; v) . This equilibrium payo¤ is at least as large as his equilibrium payo¤ in the game G 1 (N; v), because the proposer can always wait until period n to divide the payo¤. This equilibrium payo¤ is in turn at least as high as 1 (N; v), because (N; v) is a balanced proposal.
An example
The next example illustrates that a MBRE need not be a subgame perfect equilibrium. Computing the outcome associated to any MBRE we see that the proposer receives as payo¤ the amount 1 (N; v) = 121=6: As we know, this result is true for any order of the responders. Suppose the order of responders is 2, 3, 4, 5. The following result holds given this order: If the responders play the game optimally (not necessarily as myopic maximizers) the proposer can get a higher payo¤ than the one provided by the MBRE outcome. Therefore, MBRE and SPE outcomes do not necessarily coincide.
The strategy is the following: The proposer o¤ers nothing in the …rst three stages. In the 4th period the proposal is: (10; 10; 5; 0; 0):
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The responses of players 2, 4 and 5 do not change the proposal (even if the proposal faced by player 4 and 5 is a new one resulting from a rejection of player 3). If player 3 accepts this proposal, the TU game for the last period will be:
11 if S 2 ff1; 2; 3; 5g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg 11 if S = f1; 2; 4; 5g 26
if S = N 0 otherwise.
In the last period, myopic and rational behavior coincide, so the outcome must be an element of B 1 (N; w): It can be checked that B 1 (N; w) = f(5:5; 5:5; 0; 0; 0)g : Therefore, after accepting the proposal in period 4, player 3 gets a total payo¤ of 5:
If player 3 rejects the proposal, the outcome of the 4th period is (15; 10; 0; 0; 0) and the TU game for the last period is:
11 if S 2 ff1; 2; 3; 5g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg 6 if S = f1; 2; 4; 5g 26
As before, in the last period myopic and rational behavior coincide and the outcome must be an element of B 1 (N; u): It can be checked that B 1 (N; u) = f(5:2; 5:2; 5:2; 5:2; 5:2)g : Therefore, after rejecting the proposal player 3 gets a total payo¤ of 5:2:
Therefore, rational behavior of player 3 implies a rejection of the proposal in the 4th period. This rejection is not a myopic maximizer's behavior. After the rejection of player 3 the proposer gets a payo¤ of 20:2, higher than 121=6. Hence, the outcome associated to MBRE is not the outcome of a SPE.
In the example above, the proposer …nds a credible way to collude with player 3 in order to get a higher payo¤ than the one obtained by player 2 (a veto player). Player 2 cannot avoid this collusion since he is responding before player 3. If he responded after player 3, collusion between players 1 and 3 would no longer be pro…table. This observation turns out to be crucial as we will see in the next section.
Finally, consider the following pro…le of strategies: the proposer plays the strategy presented in Lemma 7 and the responders behave as myopic maximizers. This pro…le is a Nash equilibrium and its outcome is (N; v) . Therefore:
Remark 20 The MBRE outcome is a Nash outcome.
Myopic behavior and Subgame Perfect Equilibria
The previous example shows that, in general, perfectly rational behavior and myopically rational behavior do not coincide. However, they do coincide when the model incorporates a requirement on the order of the responders. From now on, we assume that at each stage t the order of the responders is given by the nonincreasing order of the d values of the game v t . That is, the order of the responders is not completely …xed in advance and can be di¤erent for di¤erent periods. Given this order, any veto responder can secure a payo¤ equal to or higher than the payo¤ obtained by the proposer. This is not the case in Example 19 where player 2 is a veto responder responding before player 3. In this example, player 3 sacri…ces a payo¤ in period 4 in order to have a better position in the TU game that is in force in period 5. The proposer needs player 3 to be non-myopic in period 4 in order to get a payo¤ higher than the payo¤ provided in a MBRE outcome. Hence, the proposer could not have achieved a payo¤ above the MBRE outcome by making balanced proposals.
The next two corollaries are immediate consequences of the results in the previous section. If z di¤ers from (N; v), z 1 1 (N; v) (otherwise the proposer would prefer to play the strategy described in lemma 7). If the proposer is using balanced proposals, he can only achieve at least 1 (N; v) if all players are getting their serial rule payo¤s, that is, if z = (N; v) (corollary 15 and lemma 16). Hence, z 1 is not achievable by balanced proposals.
Corollary 22 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game and G n (N; v) its associated tree game. Let z = n the equilibrium path in which p accepts the proposal, and the subgame o¤ the equilibrium path in which p rejects the proposal. We will talk about the A-path (the equilibrium path) and the Rpath. Denote by x t A and x t R the …nal payo¤s at stage t depending on whether player p accepts or rejects the proposal. If player p rejects the proposal, we take any subgame perfect equilibrium of that subgame. Denote by v We now show that p is also veto at t + 1 on the R-path.
Suppose p is not veto at t + 1 on the R-path. Then there is a coalition S p such that p = 2 S p and
Thus, player p is a veto player at t + 1 regardless of whether he accepts or rejects the proposal. Given the order of moves, veto players can secure at least the same payo¤ as the proposer. There is no reason for veto players to act nonmyopically because the game at t + 2 will be the same regardless of how the payo¤ is distributed at t + 1 between veto players; no payo¤ can go to anyone else given the order of responders. For the same reason the proposer will never make a proposal that gives another veto player more than he gets himself, so that all veto players must get the same payo¤ given the order of moves. Let y R 1 be player 1's payo¤ if p rejects the proposal (this is the payo¤ accumulated between periods t+1 and n) and y for some i. By assumption this is not the case. Thus, it was not in p's interest to accept: rejecting would yield a higher payo¤ at t, and at least the same payo¤ in the rest of the game.
b2) The last player to act nonmyopically at t has rejected a proposal.
Let p be the last player to act nonmyopically at t. This player cannot be player k because after any rejection (myopic or otherwise) it holds that f 1k (:) x t k , and given that the remaining responders act myopically this inequality would never be reversed. Someone moving after k must have rejected a proposal nonmyopically (transferring payo¤ to the proposer) and created the inequality f 1k (x t ; v t ) > x t k , hence player p must be moving after k. We will show that it is not in p's interest to reject the proposal. To do this, we need to analyze two subgames: the subgame on the equilibrium path in which p rejects the proposal, and the subgame o¤ the equilibrium path in which p accepts the proposal. We will talk about the R-path (the equilibrium path) and the A-path.
Because f 1l (x t ; v t ) > 0 for l 2 f2; :::; kg, on the equilibrium path all players in f2; :::; kg are veto players at t + 1. Suppose player p is veto also on the A-path. Then the reasoning of case b1 applies, and there is no reason for p to act nonmyopically in period t. Now suppose player p is not veto on the A-path at t + 1. We de…ne d We have shown that any SPE outcome is such that the proposer can always achieve z 1 with balanced proposals. Balanced proposals in the proof were always constructed by (possibly) cutting down some of the responders' payo¤s, never by increasing them. Hence, any SPE outcome, m P 1 x t ; could be obtained as follows: The proposer proposes sequentially (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m ) and the responders behave as myopic maximizers. Therefore, any SPE outcome coincides with the outcome resulting from a pro…le of strategies where all responders play as myopic maximizers. And among all these pro…les, if the proposer plays optimally the outcome is unique (Theorem 17). Therefore, Theorem 27 Let (N; v) be a veto balanced TU game and G n (N; v) its associated tree game in which the responders move following the order of nonincreasing d values of v k . Then (N; v) is the outcome of any SPE.
Concluding remarks
We have provided noncooperative foundations for the serial rule (N; v) in veto balanced games. We have also shown that any SPE outcome of our bargaining procedure is achievable with myopic behavior of the responders if responders move by increasing strength (lemma 26). This result is independent of the number of periods. If there are at least n 1 periods, the only SPE outcome is the serial rule: the proposer is always able to obtain 1 (N; v)
by making balanced proposals, and the only way to obtain this payo¤ is if all other players get i (N; v) as well. If there are fewer than n 1 periods, it is not necessarily possible for the proposer to achieve 1 (N; v). If z is a SPE outcome, it is still true that the proposer can obtain z 1 by making balanced proposals, hence all SPE outcomes must have the same z 1 , but there may be several SPE outcomes if z 1 < 1 (N; v).
